

## Panel 3.3 Abstracts

***The Hedgehog and the Fox and the Lion: An Essay on Machiavelli's View of History*****Matthew Slaboch**

Denison University (United States)

Contact: [slabochm@denison.edu](mailto:slabochm@denison.edu)

In one of his most acclaimed essays, "The Hedgehog and the Fox," Isaiah Berlin suggests that writers fall into one of two camps: in the first are those "who relate everything to a single central vision," and in the second are "those who pursue many ends" and whose thinking is "scattered or diffused." Drawing from a line of ancient Greek poetry, Berlin terms these two groups, respectively, the "hedgehogs" and the "foxes." Representative hedgehogs include Plato, Hegel, and Dostoevsky, while notable foxes include Aristotle, Goethe, and Pushkin. After having introduced his dichotomy and explained what it means for a writer to fall on one side of the divide or the other, Berlin presents a problem: Tolstoy, a novelist and thinker of undisputed talents, does not fit neatly on either side. Berlin spends the bulk of his essay defending the thesis that "Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog." In making his argument, he focuses particularly on Tolstoy's philosophy of history, investigating Tolstoy's thoughts on such questions as the roles of fate and free will in human affairs and the possibility of moral, political, and other types of progress.

Taking Berlin's famed piece as a starting point and model, my essay turns our attention from Tolstoy to Machiavelli and does three things. First, it asks whether we should consider the Florentine philosopher and historian a hedgehog whose works and life demonstrate a singular focus, or a fox with diffuse ideas and aims. Second, it summarizes and analyzes Machiavelli's philosophy of history, paying special attention to the role Machiavelli ascribes to political leaders in the shaping of events. Here I consider animal imagery that Machiavelli himself employs, namely that a ruler "should imitate both the fox and the lion" by being simultaneously crafty and forceful. The essay concludes by considering the relevance of philosophy of history generally, and the implications of Machiavelli's philosophy of history in particular, for present-day politicians and policymakers and citizens and subjects alike.

## Panel 3.3 Abstracts

***History, political science, and trade. The original Machiavelli of David Hume*****Spartaco Pupo**

University of Calabria (Italy)

Contact: [spartaco.pupo@unical.it](mailto:spartaco.pupo@unical.it)

My paper aims to revisit the articulate and differentiated positions of the contemporary scholars who have dealt with the influence of Niccolò Machiavelli on David Hume, such as F. G. Whelan, G. Giarrizzo, J. Maček, and D. F. Norton. From a careful comparison of Hume as a political thinker and statesman, rather than as an epistemologist and metaphysician, to Machiavelli and the tradition of “Machiavellism”, a series of facets brings out, which are explainable thanks to the intellectual esteem of the Scottish author for the Florentine secretary. It is within the framework of political reflections that we can identify the main interconnections between the two thinkers’ perspectives: from the realistic view of the genesis of “dishonesty” to the emphasis on passions and their limiting power of reason; from the common interest for the importance of the study of history to the conception of political science as requiring the regularity of the configurations of experience. But there are also considerable differences to be examined, such as the opportunity to transpose the experience of the Roman empire into modern Europe and the judgment on what really determines the “glory” of the states in foreign policy. Finally, I propose to examine the striking note that emerges from Hume’s Memoranda, which has not yet been explored in depth by scholars: “There is not a word of trade – Hume writes in this collection of youthful notes – in all Matchiavel, which is strange considering that Florence rose only by trade”. Is this a superficial reading of Hume, or what the Scotsman said corresponds to reality? Answering this question is important because it allows us to understand, from a historical point of view, that Hume, while underlining the flaw of Machiavelli, nevertheless does not adhere to the position of Mandeville, who insisted that the health of a nation was intimately linked to the prosperity of its trade. In the conclusions I dwell on the original and courageous Machiavelli historicization process initiated by Hume himself.

## Panel 3.3 Abstracts

***Reflections on Machiavelli's Contribution to Management, Marketing and Public Affairs*****Phil Harris**

University of Chester (United Kingdom)

Contact: [P.harris@chester.ac.uk](mailto:P.harris@chester.ac.uk)

It is 550 years since Niccolo Machiavelli was born in Florence in 1469 of a very old Tuscan family. The young Machiavelli had a vigorous humanist education, was taught Latin by good teachers and had access to the best of classical history and ideas. Little is known about the rest of his life until at the surprisingly young age of twenty-nine in 1498, he was recognised by the Signory for his administrative talents, and was elected to the responsible post of Chancellor of the Second Chancery. He is also given duties in the Council of the Ten of Liberty and Peace (formerly Ten of War), which dealt with Florentine foreign affairs.

During his time in office, his journeys included missions to Louis XII and to the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian in Austria; he was with Cesare Borgia in the Romagna; and after watching the Papal election of 1503, he accompanied the newly elected Pope, Julius II on his first campaign of conquest against Perugia and Bologna. In 1507, as a Chancellor of the recently appointed Nove di Milizia, he organised an infantry force which fought at the capture of Pisa in 1509. Three years later this force was defeated by the Holy League at Prato and the Medici returned to power in Florence. Machiavelli was almost immediately excluded from public life as a previous holder of high office under the former republican regime, where he had built up a number of powerful enemies who were determined he should not retain his post.

After being falsely implicated in a plot against the Medici he is imprisoned in the Bargello and hideously tortured. He maintains his innocence and is eventually granted an amnesty on the election of the new pope, Leo X, (Cardinal dei Medici) and retires to his farm six miles away from Florence just outside San Casiano, where he lives with his wife and six children and concentrates on study and writing. For much of the rest of his life his movements are restricted by one regime or another because of his past. He desperately wants to return to government service to serve Florence and his countrymen, "If only to roll stones" (Letters to Vettori) but never regains public office. At forty-three, Machiavelli's public career had ended, but his work as a writer, for which he is celebrated, was just beginning.

He wrote *The Prince* in just a few months in 1513. In which he attacks "the writers" whose inconsistent moralism allows them to admire great deeds but not the cruel acts necessary to accomplish them. *The Prince* was never published during its author's lifetime, and although circulating quite widely in manuscript form, it seems to have caused little if any controversy during Machiavelli's life. In 1532, five years after Machiavelli's death it was published in Rome. In 1559 all of Machiavelli's works are condemned and placed on the Papal Index.

It is his continuing reputation and the influence of *The Prince* which has resulted in the use of the Machiavellian theme by Management commentators such as Jay (1967), Calhoun (1969), Shea (1988), Curry (1995), McAlpine (1992 and 1997), Harris, Lock and Rees (2000) and Harris (2013).

## Panel 3.3 Abstracts

***Time, Virtù and the State of Exception: A Machiavellian Approach to Emergency Powers*****Theodore Lai**

University of Chicago (United States)

Contact: [theodorelai360@gmail.com](mailto:theodorelai360@gmail.com)

In the third chapter of *Il Principe*, Machiavelli advises the reader to pay due consideration to time, “for time sweeps everything before it and can bring with it good as well as evil and evil as well as good”. This adage suggests that a significant aspect of Machiavelli’s thought is concerned with temporal considerations. What a wise prince does is inextricably bound up with when he should do it. Yet Machiavelli’s considerations of time do not simply lie in discerning what time brings, but in one’s ability to change to suit the times. Regimes and leaders who fail to break from habit as their situation demands will come to ruin.

Against the medieval tradition of his day, Machiavelli argues that fortune can be contested, foregrounding the ability of men to institute autonomous change as the times demand - what Machiavelli terms “excellent virtù”. A concrete way to think about fortune is through the phenomenon of Emergencies, and the ability of human beings to combat crisis and unpredictability. In contemporary concerns of material procurement and economic distribution, urgency is commonly harnessed as a key narrative device. Environmental change and the exponential depletion of essential resources such as water and shelter are increasingly framed in Machiavellian terms of taming and subverting the vicissitudes of fortune through strength and cunning. The means by which governments justify new policies – special increment of carbon taxes, or revised arrangements in foreign trade contracts, or investments in food technologies – rely heavily on communicating the urgency of changing times and insisting that a stable future could be secured if costly action is allowed to take place.

Recent scholarship has similarly foregrounded such narratives by invoking Machiavelli and time in the problem of emergency powers in liberal democracies. In particular, Nomi Clair Lazar, herself an authority on Machiavelli and emergencies, defends the primacy of a state of exception by arguing that emergencies warrant the suspension of law. Necessity is taken as a suitable context for laws to be relaxed in order to maintain the existence of the state or enforce its advancement. However, does exception constitute a necessity to reject institutionalized laws, or more importantly, bring opportunities to alter one’s mode – practices and habits – to suit the changing times, given the ends of human laws? Does remaining an adherent to deeply established laws in the face of pressure to relax them in fact fulfill the very spirit of necessity and action that emergencies convey?

### Panel 3.3 Abstracts

This paper thinks with Lazar, and Machiavelli behind her, to examine issues of material emergencies, suggesting that narratives of material security are enabled if situated in a time-bound frame of urgency and crisis. In doing so, it argues that *virtu* is not a matter of making exceptions to the norm of human laws, but of remaining true to the dictates of human reason by altering one's actions as necessary to suit what the changing times demand. In light of an impending apocalypse, it may not be institutionalized laws that must be dropped, but our possession of virtue, namely that of prudence, that must be tested.